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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

CLARK JAMES REDFORD,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.

12480

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant appeals his conviction for the crime
of murder in the first degree. He was convicted in the
District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, in and for
Juab County, State of Utah, the Honorable James P.
McCune, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The jury found the appellant guilty of murder in the
first degree and he was sentenced to death.

the phone and asked her if she would like to go along
(T. 1,640). Redford agreed to meet her at 8:00 p.m., October 10, 1969 (T. 1,560). Michael Branagan and Redford
then agreed to meet in Grant's Lounge, a bar located in
Spanish Fork, Utah, at 7: 00 p.m. on October 10, 1969 (T.
1,695). However, Redford failed to keep his appointment
(T. 1,695).
Redford testified that Mike Branagan left the Stocker
Club at approximately 6: 00 and that he left between 6: 30
to 6: 45 (T. 1,694). Prior to leaving Redford bought a six
pack of beer (T. 1,694).
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Redford, in accounting for the night's activities, gave
the following unsubstantiated and contradicted testimony. Redford stated that he drove to Provo to buy a
I ring at Zales Jewelers.
However, finding it closed, proI ceeded to Harold's Tap Room and Lounge, located on
Center Street in Provo (T. 1,642, 1,750). He parked
around the rear of the building (T. 1,753); the parking
lot was covered with gravel (T. 1,753). At the lounge
Redford testified that he played pool with casual acquaintances including one Tony Jensen (T. 1,642). Redford testified they played for twenty minutes and then
he and Tony Jensen went to Regal's Bowling Lane. Redford testified that he and Tony had an argument over
money which culminated in Jensen throwing a cue ball
at Redford, hitting him in the eye (T. 1,643). After an
alleged fight in the back of the Regal Bowling Lanes,
Redford testified that he got in his car which was parked
in a paved area, and went to Ream's Bargain Center
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

ti'.

The State submits that the judgment of the lower ('
court should be affirmed.
tc

tt

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On Friday, October 10, 1969, Clark James Redford
who resided at the home of his mother located at 1225
East Center Street, Springville, Utah (T. 190, 1,483) was
awakened by his mother at approximately 6: 30 in the
morning and he then drove to Pleasant Grove in a 1955
Mercury, where he then traveled to Salt Lake City with
other workers (T. 1,488, 1,633). He returned home from
his work with Fugal Construction Company early, at approximately 1: 30 in the afternoon that same day. The
job was delayed because of the weather (T. 1,489, 1,635).
He removed his high topped cowboy boots and pants, and
changed into fresh clothes which included wing tipped
dress shoes, sweater and a top coat (T. 1,635). Redford
then went to the Sage Inn in Springville where his mother
worked and there he drank a cup of coffee (T. 1,637). He
then drove to the Stocker Club which is approximately
one and one-half miles from Provo going towards Springville (T. 1,637).
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At the Stocker Club, Redford played pool with his fc
friends until approximately 6: 30 p.m. (T. 1,638). During n
this time his friend Michael Branagan came in and stated a
that he and his girl friend Bobbie (Barbara) were going a
to Ely to get married and invited Redford to come along
(T. 1,639). Redford agreed and called Kathy Palmer on
1
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where he purchased some western clothing (T. 1,645).
He then stated he took Highway 50 and 6 into Spring.
ville and talked to his mother at the Sage Inn (T. 1,646).
The record reveals that as part of the investigation
following the crime that there was no such individual as
Tony Jensen. Records and sources were checked at the
vocational school (T. 1,766), taverns, (T. 1,766), and
Brigham Young University (T. 1,767). A subpoena was
not able to be served in Utah County (T. 1,767). There
was no record of any fight at Harold's Tap Room at the
lounge as testified by the proprietor, Harold L. Thatcher
(T. 1,001-1,004). Nor was there any evidence of a fight
at the Regal Bowling Lanes (T. 1,302-1,309). Redford
was not able to produce a receipt nor was there any evi·
dence in the record that Redford had purchased western
clothing at Ream's Bargain Center as he so testified.

Ann Levanger, one of four children and the daughter
of Reed and Elva Levanger who resided in Spanish Fork,
was nineteen years old (T. 499), She shared an apart·
ment in Provo, with Karren Roberts. The morning of
October 10th, 1969, she went to the home of her parents
in Spanish Fork (T. 510). She worked at a bank in Span·
ish Fork and frequently came home for lunch (T. 510) ·
At noon, October 10, she came home for lunch clad in a
plaid skirt, a yellow-gold turtle neck, long sleeve sweater,
brown shoes and a brown bag (T. 511). Her father testi·
fied that she drove a 1965 Chevrolet Chevelle, described
as medium brown in color, that was having mechanical
problems (T. 501-2).
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Miss Levanger left Zions' National Bank with Linda
Chadwick Patterson at 6: 15 p.m. October 10. Miss
Levanger's automobile was having difficulty (T. 535), and
finally killed on the freeway at a location of 1 % miles
from the Spanish Fork turnoff on the way to Provo, Utah
(T. 526).
While Miss Levanger was inside her stalled car on
the freeway, Redford pulled his car off the freeway and
talked to her. Mr. and Mrs. Pettit, travelers on the freeway, stated that the car behind was partially in the emergency lane and partly in the right traveling lane so that
it was difficult to "merge" without coming to a complete
stop (T. 542). The Doyles, also travelers on the freeway,
observed Redford leaning over Miss Levanger's car, and
when they honked Redford looked directly at them and
smiled at short distance of from 12 to 15 feet (T. 545,
563).
Mrs. Perigo and her husband also observed Redford
at short distance leaning over the Levanger vehicle with
a big smile on his face and identified him in the court
room (T. 599, 600). Commissioner Jackson of the Highway Patrol who was driving down the freeway also observed Redford at 6: 40 and 6.45 October 10, and identified him in court (T. 632). Ned L. Deuel, a trooper for
the highway patrol, found the Levanger automobile unoccupied at approximately 6: 45 p.m. October 11, 1969
(T. 647).
On the 26th day of October, 1969, the body of Ann
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Levangei' was discovered laying 20 to 30 feet off a dirt
road face down, clad in a yellow sweater, with one sleeve
wrapped around her neck, and an orange plaid skirt (T.
706). The body was found near an old abandoned house
which was formerly owned and occupied by Redford's
grandmother. Redford had played in the house as a little
boy (T. 1,494) and had visited the house and area with
his wife's sister on about the 28th day of September, prior
to the day of the murder (T. 1,399). A piece of the
sweater Redford was wearing on October 10, 1969, was
found on a window sill of the house (T. 1,095) . In the
same general area of the body of Ann Levanger were
found her purse, shoes, and full cans of Coor's beer.
Redford did not arrive at the home of Kathleen
Palmer at 8: 00 p.m. on the evening of October 10. After
waiting about 20 minutes, Kathleen Palmer went to the
cafe with Mike Branagan and Barbara Cook (T. 1,561).
She left the cafe after about 20 or 25 minutes and drove
around for a few minutes (T. 1,577-1,587). Then she saw
Redford coming from the east and going west in his 1955
Mercury (T. 1,588). Evidence revealed that it would
have taken one hour and six minutes to go from the point
on the freeway where the Levanger car was abandoned
to Silver City and then to Goshen, Utah.
Barbara Cook (Branagan) testified that she and
Mike followed Redford as he came into Goshen over to
Barbara Cook's father's house (T. 969). At that time
Mike went to get Kathleen and Barbara got in Redford's
car. Barbara testified that there was mud all over the dash
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and floor mat and that Redford's shoes and his hands
were covered with mud and that Redford had a black
eye (T. 970). Redford stated he had a black eye because
he got in a fight over at Harold's Club in Provo (T. 971).
Barbara also testified that Redford was wearing a burnt
orange sweater (T. 974).
Mike Branagan then returned with Kathy Palmer
and they loaded the luggage in Branagan's car and went
to the Twin Pines Cafe for a coke (T. 977). They left
the cafe about 10: 00 for Ely, Nevada. While driving,
Redford laid in the back seat of the car and between
Eureka and Delta he just kept saying "Is it snowing
yet?" (T. 970). Other testimony revealed that Redford
was acting strangely. Upon arriving in Ely, Nevada, at
about 2: 00 p.m., they rented a motel and Redford told
Barbara that he hadn't slept all night (T. 979). Redford's
wife, Kathy Palmer and Redford testified that he paced
the floor all night (T. 1,606, 1,660). After the marriage
ceremony and a short distance outside of Ely, Redford
threw his shoes out the window. After nearing Silver
City or the approximate area, the conversation turned
to the Levanger girl (T. 1,598). At about this time Redford stated "I did it didn't we, Milrn?" (T. 1,598).
On the 11th of December, Redford's white over blue
1955 Mercury was picked up by the operator of the

Springville Garage, Shirley Thorpe (T. 1,142). The pickup was made in front of the Redford home, where the
vehicle was located on the property line and the street
(T. 1,142). Section 492 of the Springville ordinances pro-
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vides that cars left on the public street in an inoperative
condition can be picked up and seized at any time (T.
944) . The vehicle had the engine missing as well as the
front tires. The vehicle was taken to the county garage
between 5: 30 and 6: 00, where it was not disturbed until
the 15th day of December, 1969 (T. 1,146, 1,163). After
the 15th of December the car was searched, and vacuum
sweepings revealed hair strands which according to expert
testimony were identical in 15 points to that of the victim,
Ann Levanger (T. 1,278).
The trial counsel entered into a stipulation regarding
the manner in which the vehicle was seized (T. 340-344).
However, this stipulation was altered (T. 935, 947-955).
Oral argument was presented to Judge McCune concerning the motion for suppression of evidence from the car.
The facts are based in part on the uncontradicted testimony of Greg Newton, who owned a service station and
garage in Mona, Juab County, Utah (T. 1,211) and who
also worked part time as a deputy sheriff. Mr. Newton,
before noon, went to the Sage Inn to see Redford's
mother, who had the authority to sell or give away the
1955 Mercury (T. 342). Mr. Newton did not identify
himself to Mrs. Redford, but identified himself three days
later (T. 1,222). They had a discussion on the first visit
concerning the purchase of the car and Mr. Newton asked
Mrs. Redford if she would sell it (T. 1,222). Mrs. Redford
replied that she would be more than happy to get rid of
it· all she wanted from it was the tires and the radio (T.
'
1,223).
Mr. Newton had a use for the car for parts in his
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garage business (T. 1,228). Thereafter the car was picked
up and brought to the county yard. Mr. Newton returned
the only tires on the car, the two back tires, to Mrs. Redford. There was no radio in the car (T. 951) .
Three days later, after the car was already in the
possession of the police, Mr. Newton telephoned Mrs.
Redford, identifying himself as Bart Holman, an alias
•.vhich was sometimes used in the service station business
(T. 1,224). Mr. Newton called in order to obtain the
title to the car. At that time, the title to the car was in
the name of M. D. Richmond. Redford signed and delivered the title to his mother, Mrs. Redford, in the Utah
County Jail, and then she delivered it to Mr. Newton at
the Sage Inn.
Mrs. Redford knew the car was in the county impound yard at the time title was given to Mr. Newton.
The title was delivered by Mrs. Redford to Greg Newton
prior to the time that any search was made on the automobile (T. 952). The title was then delivered to the sheriff by Greg Newton. There was a search warrant dated
the 17th day of December issued which would have
covered the car. However, it was not served because the
car, along with the title, were already in the possession
of the police (T. 953).
Counsel for Redford also filed a motion to suppress
the testimony of Linda I vie, Phyllis Valerie Reed and
Marie Howard. The motion was argued beginning at T.
1,021. Phyllis Valerie Reed would have testified that Redford by the use of a gun had sexual intercourse with her

10

in the State of Illinois (T. 1,025). Redford was charged
with robbery and rape and pled guilty to robbery on the
24th of March, 1966 (T. 1,633). Marie Howard would
have testified that about 30 days after the disappearance
of Ann Levanger that Redford attempted to abduct her
in an automobile by using a weapon and taking her
against her will (T. 1,025). The testimony of a third witness, Linda Ivie, was admitted in trial (T. 1,085). She
testified that less than 24 hours before the disappearance
of Ann Levanger the defendant, wearing the same clothes
and driving the same automobile, by the use of force, attempted to abduct her (T. 1,323).
Mack Holley, Deputy Sheriff for Utah County,
Provo, Utah, testified that the first time he had talked
to Mr. Redford concerning the homicide of Ann Levanger
was on the 1st day of December, 1969, at 2: 45 p.m. at the
Utah County Jail in the jailer's room (T. 1,168). Redford
was in prison pursuant to a charge for forgery (T. 1,168).
In the course of the interview, Redford forwarded state·
ments like "Okay, suppose I did it" (T. 1,177) ; "Okay,
I did it"; "I can't give you a statement to that effect
because"; and "You know what would happen" (T. 1,177·
1,179).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TESTIMONY OF LINDA IVIE WAS
ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW THE IDENTITY
OF THE ACCUSED AND THE METHOD OF
HIS OPERATION.

i

11

The State attempted to introduce the testimony of
three victims of Redford's assaults. The trial court suppressed the testimony of two of the witnesses, but admitted the testimony of Linda Ivie (T. 1,089). Prior to
the testimony given by Linda I vie, the court gave a limiting instruction:
"I think it would be proper for the court to
state for your information in connection with my
instruction to you that her testimony will undoubtedly concern another offense or an alleged
unlawful act by the defendant. This is admitted
by the court only for the purpose of identity of
the defendant and for a method of operation. As
we say in the law, modus operandi, or the initial
M initial 0, which is commonly referred to. Now,
I'll state that again, that you are to consider the
testimony only as to the identity of the defendant,
his presence in the locality and any method of
operation of action on his part which you may
consider from the testimony of this witness. In
any event, you are not to consider this as any
proof of another offense and simply for the purposes for which the court has stated." (T. 1,31718). (Emphasis added.)
Redford asserts that the trial court erroneously admitted the testimony of Linda I vie which described an
assault upon her person by himself on the evening prior
to Miss Levanger's murder. Redford further asserts that
despite the limiting instruction, the jury was permitted
to consider Mrs. Ivie's testimony for whatever purpose
desired, citing this Court's earlier decision of State v.
Winget, 6 Utah 2d 243, 310 P. 2d 738 (1957).

l~

Redford erreonsly asserts that the conviction should be
reversed because Winget holds that prior sex acts are
inadmissible unless they involve the complaining witness.
Where the identity of the defendant is in issue, evi.
dence of an assault upon another woman is admissible
to prove the identity of the defendant in a rape-murder
prosecution. The general rule regarding the admissibility
of other criminal acts is that such acts are admissible il
they form an element of the crime or are relevant to show
the "(1) intent, (2) motive, (3) knowledge, (4) plan or
scheme, or (5) the identity of the defendant." Whart-On
Criminal Law, Sec. 235, 240 (1955). If the evidence has
a special relevancy to prove the crime for which the defendant stands charged, such evidence will be admissible
for that purpose; and the fact that the evidence shows
the commission of another crime will not render the evi·
dence inadmissible. State v. Dickenson, 12 Utah 2d 8,
361P.2d 412, 415 (1961).
In State v. Winget, supra, the defendant was charged
with the statutory rape of his 8 year old daughter. The
trial court allowed into evidence testimony that the 17
year old stepdaughter of the defendant had been raped
on four separate occasions by the defendant when the 17
year old girl had been near the age of the prosecutrix.
Justice Henroid in writing the opinion of the court indi·
cated that State v. Williams, 36 Utah 273, 103 P. 250
(1909) was controlling and that a new trial must be
granted. The Court also indicated that 167 A. L. R. 588
(1947) represents the majority view, which position is the
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same as that of the State of Utah.

Winget is not applicable to the case at bar on the
following grounds: (1) Winget purported to follow the
majority view in 167 A. L. R. 588, which stated the rule
as:
"Testimony as to the defendants having committed or having attempted to commit, similar
offenses with girls other than the prosecutrix has
been regarded, in the majority of the statutory
rape cases in which the question has arisen, as to
be so unrelated to the offense for which the conviction was sought as to be inadmissible in evidence." Id. at 588. (Emphasis added.)
The annotation then cited as one of the cases follow-

ing this position is State v. Williams, 36 Utah 273, 103 P.
250 (1909). However, while this may be the general rule
as to statutory rape, the subject of both Williams and
Winget, this is not the law as to common law rape. In
167 A. L. R. 594 under the heading "2. Other offense not

with same person," subsection (a), offense of rape or
attempted rape, or sexual intercourse, the general rule is
stated to be:
"Evidence of the prior rape of, or assault
upon, another woman has been held to be admissible for purposes of identification, or of showing the plan, scheme, or bent of mind of the defendant in a prosecution for forcible rape." Id. at
594. (Emphasis added.)
Also in Williams, supra, the court quoted from Wharton's Crim. Law 635, " ... [n]or is admissible to prove independent crimes, even though of the same general char-
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acter, except when falling strictly within the exceptions
stated." Id. at 278. (Emphasis added.)
(2) In Winget the court failed to give limiting instructions, but the trial court instructed the jury:
"You are instructed that if you find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that such other
acts were in fact committed by the defendant,
such evidence is admissible for the sole purpose of
showing a system, plan and scheme of the defendant and to prove the lustful and lascivious disposition of the defendant and as having a tendency
to render it more probable the acts of sexual in·
tercourse charged in the information were committed on or about the date alleged, and for no
other purpose." State v. Winget, appellant's brief
8630.
There is little question that the instruction given in
Winget was clearly erroneous for prior offenses cannot be
used to show the lustful disposition of the defendant. As
explained, the trial court in the present case did give a
limiting instruction.
(3)

The court stated in Williams, supra:

". . . The statement that he had committed
like crimes with other girls in no way tended to
elucidate or explain the alleged assault upon the
complaining witness. It was a narrative or recital
of transactions which were neither directly nor remotely connected with the crime under consideration .... " Id. at 277, 278.
Similarly, in Winget the alleged rape of the 17 year old
bore no particular relationship to the incident for which
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the defendant was being tried. There was no showing
that the acts relating to the 17 year old girl were in any
way related to the rape of the prosecutrix, which was the
crime for which the defendant was being tried. Identity
was not in question, nor was there any question of modus
operandi as there is in the present case.
(4) The first incident of rape of the 17 year old
stepdaughter in Winget took place when she was 8 or 9
years old, and the last when she was 12. Thus, there was
a period of 5 years between last incident of rape and 9
years difference between the first incident of rape and
the testimony of the stepdaughter at trial when she was
17 years old.
In the present case, Linda I vie was assaulted by Redford within twenty-four hours of his act of rape and murder upon Ann Levanger. In view of the short time span,
the assault on Linda I vie could be considered part of the
res gestae of the crime. Gephart v. State, 249 S. W. 2d
612 (Tex. 1952).
In the case at bar the testimony of Linda Ivie was
admissible for it was relevant to show both the identity
of the accused and his method of operation. Linda Ivie
was married and living in Springville, Utah, and employed
as a secretary at Brigham Young University, while her
husband went to school. She was twenty-nine years of
age and described as an attractive young lady (T. 1,850).
She went to a Springville laundromat about 9: 00 on October 9, 1969, to wash her clothes and knitted while she
waited for them to dry (T. 1,320). She noticed a tur-
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quoise and white car go slowly up the street, then the
car pulled up in front and parked in front of the laundromat. Redford walked from the car into the laundromat
and talked to her for a minute and then grabbed hold
of her (T. 1,323). Up to the time he had grabbed her
Redford spoke in a normal conversational tone (T. 1,323).
When Mrs. I vie stood up she noticed he had a pocket
knife in his hand (T. 1,338). Redford told her to put his
arm around her and walk out to the car (T. 1,324). She
stated that his car was a '56 or '57 Mercury or Lincoln
(T. 1,325). As Redford opened the door, Mrs. Ivie broke
away and hid in some bushes. She identified both the
color and the style of the sweater Redford was wearing
as well as the color of his pants and also the fact that
Redford was wearing a school ring.
One of the most critical factors in showing the method
of operation of Redford is the sheer brashness and openness of the two assaults. In the words of defense counsel:
"Remember the location of this crime in
Springville, as I recall, 1st South and 1st West,
one block off the main street in Springville. Clark
Redford lived in Springville, most of the people in
Springville, in that area knew him. The Stocker
Club, in fact is only three or four blocks from here.
If someone were to commit this type of crime
would they do it in their own neighborhood? (T.
1,850, 54).
In comparing the method of his assault upon Ivie
with that upon Ann Levanger, Redford was present right
on the freeway leaning over the side of the victim's auto·
mobile with at least four witnesses observing him from
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a distance of ten to fifteen feet. Redford actually turned
and smiled at the witnesses within minutes of a brutal
and depraved act.

In both cases, Redford talked prior to his crimes in
a seemingly normal conversational manner. In both cases
Redford did or attempted to perpetrate his crimes with
the use of an old dilapidated automobile, parked where
any passerby would notice it. In both cases the victims
were young and attractive. In the case of Linda I vie,
Redford used a knife to force her to leave the laundromat
and get in his automobile. In the case of Ann Levanger,
her roommate and witness for the defense, Karren Roberts, stated as follows:
"Q. And during the time that you lived together and you knew Ann Levanger did you get
to know her fairly well?
A.

Yes. We were very close.

Q. How would you describe her as far as her
character is concerned?
A. A very lovely person to know, a person
to get close to, someone that you could confide in.
She was friendly with people and just a good person.

*

*

*

Q. Knowing Miss Levanger, knowing her
character and her personality, I will ask you if
you have an opinion as to whether or not she
would accept a ride with a strange man?
A.

No.
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Q.

Yes or no, if you have an opinion.

A.

Yes I have an opinion.

Q.

And what is that opinion?

A. No, unless she was forced" (T. 1,462-3).
(Emphasis added.)

It is evident from the defense's own witness that Ann

Levanger would not have willingly entered that vehicle
of Redford unless she was forced against her will. The
evidence of the Ivie assault is admissible to detennine
Redford's method of operation.
Redford states, "The identity of a perpetrator of the
offense is the only significantly triable issue" (Appellant's
brief page 5). The testimony of Linda Ivie also was relevant to reveal the identity of the accused. Redford was
wearing the same clothes as the day of the murder, driving the same car and also was wearing a class ring. Mrs.
I vie also described Redford's looks, including color of his
hair, etc. There is little question that her testimony had
relevance in describing and identifying the accused, Clark
James Redford.
In State v. McHenry, 7 Utah 2d 289, 323 P. 2d 711
(1958), this Court stated:
". . . It is true evidence of a prior crime is as
a general rule not admissible in the prosecut~on
of an accused for a charged offense. An exception
to this rule exists in instances when such evidence
tends to aid of the identification of the defendant
presently charged." Id. at 291.
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See also, State v. Baran, 25 U. 2d 16, 474 P. 2d 728
(1970).
In People v. Clark, 86 Cal. Rptr. 106, 6 Cal. App. 3d
658 ( 1970) , which has a fact situation similar to the case
at bar, the court held that evidence in a prosecution for
murder as to prior sex offenses committed by a defendant
which were sufficiently similar to each other and the
crime for which the defendant was being tried, were admissible to prove a common scheme, plan or modus operandi and was admissible to establish the defendant's
identity. See also Mims v. State, 241 So. 2d 715 (Fla.
App. 1970) and Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla.
1959). In People v. Lindsay, 38 Cal. Rptr. 755, 227 Cal.
App. 2d 482 (1964) the Court held that the essential
question for determination in each instance is whether:
". . . [t] here is either a direct or circumstantial
connection between the similar offense and the
charged offense to support the inference that if
the defendant committed the similar offense, he
probably committed the act charged. That determination requires that the facts pertaining to
the other offense show a general pattern, scheme
or plan. . . . Whether the applicable test is satis-

fied is primarily a question for the trial court."
Id. at 769. (Emphasis added.)

It is clear from the facts and applicable case law that
the testimony of Linda I vie was admissible for the limited
purpose of showing Redford's identity and method of
operation.
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POINT II.
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY DID NOT EXCEED THE PERMISSIBLE BOUNDS OF
CROSS-EXAMINATION WHEN CROSS-EXAMINING REDFORD.
The judge is the person who has the final responsibility for conducting the trial. He should be allowed
considerable latitude of discretion with the mechanics of
procedure. Utah Code Ann. § 77-44-5 (1953), provides
in part that if a defendant offers himself as a witness he
may be cross-examined by the counsel for the state the
same as any other witness.

As stated in 3 Wharton Criminal Evidence, § 887
(1955):
"Considerable or great latitude should be allowed in the cross-examination of the defendant
even though his testimony is self incriminating.
Some courts state that an even wider or greater
latitude in the cross-examination of the accused
should be allowed than is ordinarily the case....
As an application of the rule applicable to witnesses, generally the form, extent, and latitude of
the cross-examination of an accused who voluntar·
ily offers himself as a V'litness are matters for the
discretion of the trial court. . . . The discretion
will not be interfered with by the reviewing court
unless there is a clear abuse thereof."
In Hopper v. State, 302 P. 2d 162 (Okl. 1956), thE
defendant appealed his conviction for sodomy and ob
jected to the scope of cross-examination. The court withir
the opinion echoed the same rule of law as phrased ir
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Wharton by stating:

" ... Moreover, where a defendant, in a criminal
case takes the stand in his own behalf, he may be
cross-examined to the same extent as any other
witness, and the extent of the examination is a
matter within the trial court's sound discretion,
Murphy v. State, 72 Old. Cr. 1, 112 P. 2d 438 and
will not be interfered with on appeal unless fragrantly abused." Id. at 166.
In the present case Redford voluntarily took the witness stand and in the face of his prior out of court statement, testimony of eye witnesses and circumstantial evidence relating to the crime, flatly denied that he had even
seen Ann Levanger. It is a well known general rule of
law that the accused may be cross-examined for the purpose of impeachment by questions which tend to impeach
his credibility, by inquiry as to prior contradictory statement, as to matters relating to memory, motives, history,
past conduct and other matters affecting his credibility.
Dixon v. State, 228 Ark. 430, 307 S. W. 2d 792 (1957),
State v. Reid, 146 Conn. 227, 149 A. 2d 698 (1959).

After the defense counsel objected to the District
Attorney's line of questioning the court stated:
"The court feels, however that perhaps the
way some of the questions were framed by Mr.
Burns, just before the objection are too much conjecture and insinuations or intimations and not
perhaps the best way, proper way of asking the
defendant to admit or deny certain facts which
have been presented in evidence and referred to
in this case."
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The District Attorney rightfully questioned Redford
about exhibits that were in evidence and attempted to
impeach his testimony. Redford in stating that the questions asked by Mr. Burns were prejudicial, ignores the
bulk of a lengthy cross-examination. If anything Redford's testimony during cross-examination was helpful
rather than prejudicial for he certainly did not deny his
alibi during the examination.
Redford relies on two cases for his theory that the
cross-examination was prejudicial. McDonald v. Price,
181 P. 2d 115 (Cal. 1947) arose out of an action for wrongful death. In that case, the plaintiff's sole assignment
of error related to the prejudicial misconduct of defen·
dant's counsel in asking a series of questions over plaintiff's objections with respect to criminal activities of the
decedent some years prior to his death. Leeth v. State,
230 P. 2d 942, (Okla. 1951), concerned the attempted ad·
mission of a wire recording, which then prompted the
remarks of the court. Neither case is applicable to the
facts of the case at bar.
Let us not forget that Redford was being tried for
the most heinous of all crimes, rape and murder. As stated
in Wingate v. State, 232 So. 2d 44 (Fla. App. 1970):
" ... Certainly the ideal climate for the con·
duct of a criminal trial is one of fair and cool im·
partiality, Goddard v. State, 143 Fla. 28, 196 So.
596 (1940). However, the emotional weakne~ses
unto which men are prone have been recogmzed
by the common law and provision has beei:i made
for these human fallibilities which may mtrude
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upon the most experienced prosecuting attorneys."
Id. at 45.
Assuming arguendo that the manner of cross-examination was prejudicial to the defendant, it must still be
considered harmless error, Chapman v. California, 306
U. S. 18 (1967). Many jurisdictions have enunciated the
principle that the concept of a "fair trial" must not be
confused with that of a perfect trial. An accused has
constitutional right to a "fair trial" but not necessarily
to that seldom experienced rarity of a perfect trial. State
v. Smith, 119 W. Va. 347, 193 S. E. 573, 574 (1964). In
light of the overwhelming amount of evidence that was
brought forward by the State, the cross-examination of
Redford was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and
would not affect the outcome of the trial.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED
TO GRANT REDFORD'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE DISCOVERED AS
A RES ULT OF THE SEARCH OF THE
AUTOMOBILE.
This case represents a rather unusual fact situation.
At the time the car was given to Greg Newton, a garage
owner and part time employee of the county sheriff's
office, by Redford's mother, Redford was incarcerated in
the Utah State Prison, pursuant to a recent conviction
for forgery (T. 1,632) and a prior conviction in 1966 for
robbery for which conviction he was on parole (T. 1,635).
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Mrs. Rc:dford had the authority to sell or give away the
vehicle (T. 342). The car was out in the front of her
house partially in the street in a dilapidated condition
without an engine with the hood up and without tires ;
or hubs on the front wheels. Mr. Newton went to the
Sage Inn, where Redford's mother was working, and
without telling her his name asked if she would like to
sell the car. She replied that she would be more than
happy to get rid of it and only requested that Mr. Newton
give her the tires and the radio out of the car. The car
was later towed away that same day and three days later
Mr. Newton using the name of Bart Holman, an alias he
used in the garage business, called Mrs. Redford request·
ing the title. She went to the prison, had Redford sign it,
and knowing the car was in the county impound yard,
Mrs. Redford delivered the title to Mr. Newton. There·
after, the car was searched. The search revealed five
strands of hair which were later identified as being identi·
cal to the type of hair of Ann Levanger.
Redford urges that the auto was not validly seized
and therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment. The
Fourth Amendment provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against ~n·
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be v10·
lated and no warrants shall issue, but upon prob·
able ~ause supported by oath or affirmation and
particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized." (Empha·
sis added.)
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Although the language of the Amendment is clear
that it pro1'jbits only unreasonable searches and seizures
'
the Supreme Court of the United States, through its construction of the Fourth Amendment applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth, has evolved a doctrine in
respect to automobile searches which is most recently
expressed in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 91 S. Ct. 2022
(1971). There are various exceptions to Coolidge, such
as consent and standing, and the present case falls within
those exceptions.
In the recent case of United States v. Wilmoth, 325
F. Supp. 1397 (1971), where agents were acting in an undercover capacity and the defendant relinquished possession of a double-barreled shot gun and rifle and a quantity of ammunition to agents voluntarily, not realizing
they were federal agents, the court held there was no
reason to suppress that evidence. This principle has long
been recognized in cases wherein narcotics agents misrepresent their identity in order to purchase narcotics from
a willing seller. Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. 206
(1966). However, in the present case, Mr. Newton did
not misrepresent himself but simply asked if he could buy
the car and thereafter upon agreement obtained possession of the automobile.
The State submits that the case of State v. Montayne, 18 Utah 2d 38, 414 P. 2d 958 (1966) is controlling
under the present factual situation. In Montayne the
defendant was found guilty of the crimes of robbery and
grand larceny, and argued on appeal that the trial court
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erred in failing to suppress certain evidence. The defen.
dant was driving a rental car and after a police officer
who stopped the vehicle found the car was far overdueI I
arrested the defendant for car theft. After arresting the :
defendant the officer searched the vehicle and found incriminating evidence used in the course of robbery and
grand larceny charges.
I

The court then stated:
"Three questions arise with regard to that
case: (1) was the search incident to a lawful
arrest? (2) if not did the appellant have standing
to object to the unlawful search and seizure, (3)
if not incident to unlawful arrest and if the appellant had 'standing' to object, was the evidence
prejudicial or merely harmless error?" Id. at 41.
This Court then stated that it did not need to consider
question (1) and (3) because the answer to (2) was
dispositive of the case. This Court then explained that
in order for the appellant to have standing the sole pre·
requisite is that he claim a proprietary interest in the
search or seized property. Simpson v. United States, 346
F. 2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965).
The court distinguished Simpson m M ontayne by
stating:
" . . . [t]he Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
gave such standing to a defendant because h.e
claimed a possessory interest in the car and hzs
lack of ownership was not established until after
the search. (Emphasis ours.) Here lack of owner·
ship was established with reasonable certainty

'
1
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before the search, thus distinguishing it from the
Simpson case." Id. at 41.

Here also Redford does not have standing to challenge the admission of evidence obtained from the car.
Title to the car was in the name of M. D. Richards. The
search was not conducted until after Greg Newton was
the owner and had title to the automobile. The fact that
Newton was working part time for the sheriff's office or
he knew the sheriff's office had use of the car is not relevant for title and possession of the car were obtained as
a private individual. (See Herbert v. State, 10 Md. App.
279, 269 A. 2d 430 (1970) .) Utah Code Ann § 41-2-1 (e)
(1967) provides:
" ... A person who holds the legal title of a
vehicle or in the event a vehicle is the subject of
an agreement for a conditional sale . . . shall be
deemed the owner for the purpose of this act."
There is also question whether the Fourth Amendment, designed to protect a person's right to privacy,
should apply to a semi-abandoned vehicle without an
engine, sitting in the street, that was given away in return for the tires on the back hubs. This Court in Montayne, stated: "Courts are diligent in preventing the lowering of barriers which protect the individual liberties of
our citizens, but in the exercise of this diligence the personal and property rights of members of the public should
not be completely overlooked for the benefit of those who
have no regard for either." Id. at 42.
In United States v. Powers, 439 F. 2d 373 (1971), the
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issue concerned the legality of a search for identification
numbers. The Court held the two most significant fac.
tors were (1) the mobility of the automobile and (2) the
"expectation of privacy" that a person may reasonably
claim for those parts of the vehicle where identification
numbers are posted. " ... Thus, warrantless searches of
the trunk, the glove compartment, the console or similar
areas have been approved, only within strict limitations
... " Id. at 375. The extent of Redford's interest in his
privacy in an automobile without an engine, without the
tires and sitting partially in a public street while Redford
was incarcerated could not be great, especially in light
of the fact that Mrs. Redford was more than happy to
get rid of the car.

According to the record (T. 944) a Springville or·
dinance provides that cars left on the public street in an
inoperative condition can be picked up and seized at any
time. In Dyke v. Taylor Implement Manufacturing Co.,
391 U. S. 216 (1968) the Court noted that although the
police had taken an automobile and its occupant to a jail
- there was no indication that the police had purported
to impound or hold the automobile, or that they weri
authorized by any state law to do so, or that their seard
of the automobile was intended to implement the purpos1
of such custody. See, Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 51
(1967). In the present case it appears that the poliet
could have been justified in seizing on the grounds of th1
city ordinance for the automobile was at least partiallJ
in the street.
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Furthermore, the argument may not be made that
the officers could have obtained a search warrant and did
not do so. In the first place the officers did not need a
search warrant. They had possession of the car and also
permission to search the car from Greg Newton who was
given title to the car. Secondly, in United States v.
Dgembiewski, 437 F. 2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1971), the Court
stated:
". . . It is no answer to say that the police
could have obtained a search warrant, for '[t)he
relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to
procure a search warrant but whether the search
was reasonable'." United States v. Rabinowitz, 399
U. S. 56, 66 [70 S. Ct. 430, 435, 94 L. Ed. 653)."
Id. at 1215.
Redford relies primarily on Gouled v. United States,
255 U. S. 298 (1921), in stating that the evidence was
illegally obtained. In Gouled a business acquaintance of
the petitioner, acting under orders of federal officers, obtained entry into the petitioner's office by falsely representing that he intended only to pay a social visit. In
the petitioner's absence the intruder secretly ransacked
the office and seized certain private papers of an incriminating nature. The Supreme Court had no difficulty
concluding that the Fourth Amendment had been violated
by the secret and general ransacking. This clearly is not
similar to the facts of the case at bar. Here Newton went
to the Sage Inn where Redford's mother was working and
simply asked if she would like to sell the car.
The facts and the law are clear that the evidence
obtained from the car was properly admitted at trial.
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is punishable with death?" (T. 155). (Emphasis
added.)
When asked, Mr. Knotts again replied:
"A.

I'd be the same on that" (T. 156).

On voir dire, Knotts was questioned by the Court
as to his beliefs regarding capital punishment and his
ability to return the death penalty:
"Q. Mr. Knotts, you have indicated that you
have some question or reservation as to the death
penalty. Would your feelings in the matter prevent you from bringing in a verdict imposing the
death penalty in any event in any case without
regard to the evidence and the facts?
A. I'd say yes, because I wouldn't want that
on my conscience to sentence somebody to a death
penalty that you're not sure of, regardless.
Q. That would be your feeling in any case A. That would be right.
Q. - in which you may be a juror?
A. Yeah.
Q. Do you understand, or do you feel that a
person such as yourself who may oppose the death
penalty just as much as one who may favor it in
certain cases, that you could make your discretionary judgment and consider the matter on the
evidence and all of the facts and that you could
still fulfill your oath as a juror and vote the death
penalty if you in fact thought it should be?

A. I'd be opposed to the death penalty, I
wouldn't want it to be on the jury to give the
death penalty or hang the jury that wanted to
give the death penalty, or detain it in any way.
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POINT IV.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR GLEN KNOTTS
WAS PROPERLY EXCLUDED FROM THE
JURY PANEL.
The trial court first asked each of the 32 jurors in·
dividually that since the laws of the State of Utah pro.
vide that "Every person guilty or found guilty shall suffer
death, or upon the recommendation of the jury may be
imprisoned at hard labor in the state prison for life" (T.
152), whether the punishment affixed by law is too severe
for the offense of murder in the first degree. When asked
Mr. Knotts replied:
"A.
153).

No, I don't go for the death penalty" (T.

The Court then asked the entire body of jury men.

"Q. As the Court has explained to the jury,
this offense is punishable by death under the law
of the State of Utah, do any of you entertain a
conscientious opinion which would preclude you
from finding the defendant guilty in view of the
fact that the penalty may be death? Mr. Burras·
ton and Mr. Knotts have expressed such a reser·
vation or opinion. The court feels that it is his
duty to advise all members of the jury panel that
being opposed to the death penalty or just merely
having conscientious scruples against the death
penalty is not sufficient to disqualify you for jury
service. . . . The court will ask each of you for the
record do you have a conscientious opinion which
would preclude you from finding the defendant
guilty based upon the fact that the offense charged
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Q. Well, the Court will ask you this, Mr.
Knotts, and if you don't understand it be sure to
bring it to the court's attention. Is it yom frame
of mind at this time, then, that you could not and
that you would not under any circumstances regardless of what the evidence might be, return a
verdict recommending the death penalty?

A.

No, I couldn't do it.

Q.

That is your frame of mind, then -

A. That's right" (T. 158-60).
In Witherspoon v. United States, 391 U. S. 510
(1968), the defendant had been convicted of murder in
Illinois. At the time of his trial, an Illinois statute provided:
"In trials for murder it shall be a cause for chal·
lenge of any juror who shall, on being examined,
state that he has conscientious scruples against
capital punishment, or that he is opposed to the
same." (Emphasis added.) 391 U. S. at 512.
Pursuant to this statute, the prosecution challenged
nearly half of the prospective jurors without inquiring as
to whether or not their admitted bias against capital pun·
ishment would influence their impartiality on the guiltinnocence issue. The jury in Illinois, like in Utah, makes
findings on both the guilt-innocence and penalty issues.
The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of guilty
but reversed the imposition of the death sentence on the
grounds that:
" ... in its role as arbiter of the punishment to be
imposed, this jury fell woefully short of that irn·
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partiality to which the petitioner was entitled under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment." 391
U.S. at 516.
The Court ruled that a death-qualified jury stacks
the deck against the accused on the penalty issue. On the
other hand, the Court did not address itself to the issue
of whether or not death-qualified jurors could be excused
if their biasness would prohibit an impartial finding on
the guilt-innocence issue.
Under Utah law, a challenge for implied bias may
be taken:
"If the offense charged is punishable with death,
the entertaining of such conscientious opinions as
preclude (the juror's) finding the defendant guilty,
in which case he must neither be permitted nor
compelled to serve as a juror." (Emphasis added.)
Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-19 (9) (1953).

This is substantially different than the Illinois statute cited above. Under Utah law, mere conscientious
scruples is not enough to challenge a prospective juror.
The bias must be sufficiently strong so as to "preclude
(the juror's) finding the defendant guilty." This standard appears to be in harmony with Witherspoon, although this specific issue was not discussed in that case
as mentioned above.
However, the Nevada Supreme Court has ruled precisely on this point in Howard v. State, 446 P. 2d 163
(Nev. 1968). When this case was tried, Nevada had an
exclusion statute identical to the Utah statute cited
above.
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The defendant, on appeal, alleged error in challeng.
ing prospective jurors with scruples in light of the Wither.
spoon, case. The Court upheld the defendants' convic.:
1
tion and resolved the point on appeal by saying:
1

" ... the rationale of Witherspoon is inapposite to
the Nevada statute since the statutory purpose is
to disqualify jurors whose opinions against the
death penalty would preclude their finding the
defendant guilty. The Illinois statute considered
in Witherspoon did not involve the right to challenge for cause those prospective jurors who stated
that their reservations about capital punishment
would prevent them from making an impartial de·
cision as to the defendant's guilt." 466 P. 2d at
165.
The Nevada Court affirmed this position in Bornes
v. State, 450 P. 2d 150 (Nev. 1969).
This court in the case of State v. Kelbach, 23 Ut.ah
2d 331, 461 P. 2d 297 (1969), decided the same exact
issue before the court now. The court held that the question asked by the trial judge in his voir dire examination:

"* * * Since this offense is punishable by

death, if these men should be convicted of the
crime of first degree murder, do any of you jurors
entertain such conscientious opinions about the
death penalty as would preclude you[r] finding
a defendant guilty irrespective of how strong the
evidence may be concerning guilty? * * *" 461
P. 2d at 303.

complied with the statutory provisions of Utah Code
Ann. 77-30-19 (9) (1953). This court further added that

I
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the statute complies with the second exclusion of footnote
21 of Witherspoon, supra, wherein the court stated:

"*

* * We repeat, however, that nothing we
say today bears upon the power of a State to
execute a defendant sentenced to death by a jury
from which the only veniremen who were in fact
excluded for cause were those who made it unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might
be developed at the trial of the case before them,
or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial
decision as the defendant's guilt. * * *" 461
P. 2d at 303.

It is clear from the language of Utah Code Ann. §
77-30-19 (9) (1953), if the juror entertains conscientious
objections which would preclude finding the defendant
guilty, the juror must neither be permitted nor compelled
to serve. In view of Mr. Knotts' replies, the court could
not permit him to serve. Furthermore, the transcript is
clear that Mr. Knotts was excluded because he could not
be impartial on the guilt-innocence issue and not because
he was opposed to capital punishment.

CONCLUSION
Under Utah law, the testimony of Linda Ivie was
admissible to show the identity of the accused and also
his method of operation. Furthermore, the search of Redford's car was not conducted until after both possession
and title to the car had been lawfully transferred. There
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is similarly no merit to Redford's additional contentions
that Mr. Burns exceeded the bounds of cross-examination
or that Mr. Knotts was improperly excluded as a juror,
In light of the overwhelming amount of evidence which
the State brought forth at trial, any error must be deemed
harmless error. Wherefore, the State respectfully prays
that the judgment of the lower court be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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